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This paper explores the extent to which Indian labour in British Malaya was neglected in relation 
to both Chinese and indigenous Malays. It is a known fact that since the late 19th century, Indian 
labour had contributed immensely to economic progress, particularly in the plantation sector. If 
one were to compare the socio-economic position of the three races, the Indians could be said to 
be the most neglected lot. The effort to help the Chinese was evident during the great depression 
(1929-32) which impacted on primary commodities like tin and rubber. The rubber sector suffered 
the most when wages were reduced. To solve growing unemployment among plantation workers, 
provision was made for estate workers to leave Malaya through the Immigration Restriction 
Ordinance (1930). To be fair to the British authorities, attempts were made to encourage Indian 
labourers to get involved in land settlement schemes, but initiative was not forthcoming on the 
part of the Indians. The European planters were not keen to create permanent labour force in 
Malaya and also were unhappy with Indian public opinion over wages and living/working 
conditions. The British threatened to replace Indian labourers with Chinese and from 1931 
attempts were made to negotiate with the government of Java (Netherland Indies) for the supply 
of Javanese labour. The Indians did not enjoy the kind of opportunities granted to the Chinese. The 
British were happy to grant vacant lands for unemployed Chinese to cultivate vegetables and 
commercial crops. It has to be noted that Chinese labourers did not suffer like the Indians during 
the depression of the 1930s. Despite the slump, the number of Chinese squatters increased but 
the British did not interfere as they were the source of supply of fresh vegetables and eggs and 
were considered as useful reservoir of casual labour. Some fifty to sixty thousand Chinese were 
given Temporary Occupation Licenses with the anticipation that once the slump was over, they 
would be absorbed into the rubber and mining industries. This assured the Chinese of better 
economic opportunities after the recession. Further help was given during the Emergency when 
the Chinese were resettled in “new villages”, which later entitled them to become permanent 
owners of the land, much to the chagrin of the Malay Rulers. The Malays on the other hand were 
assisted through specific legislations such as the Malay Land Reservation Enactment (1913), 
formation of cooperatives and the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) in the 1950s. The 
Indians bore the worst brunt. They had suffered during the War under the Japanese, and did not 
benefit much in the period thereafter when many were hunted down for alleged collaboration 
with the Japanese. Neither did they enjoy the fruit of the South Indian Labour Fund. The Indians 
were left outside the ambit of state protection, and the spill-over effects continues to blight 







The Indians who came to Malaya in the late 18th and 19th century had contributed immensely to 
the development of Malaya in various sectors including  plantation and infrastructure (building of 
roads and railways). This enabled the British to spearhead their exploitation of natural resources in 
the country. However,  the British seemed to have a policy which favoured the Malays (whom they 
viewed as  “sons of the soil”) and the Chinese (who played a vital role in the mining sector). The 
Indians on the otherhand were neglected whether intentionally or otherwise, and this  had a great 
impact on their position in  independent Malaysia. 
 
Tracing the Neglect of the Indians 
 
Tamil Immigration Fund 
 
The neglect of the Indians was evident as early as 1907 when the British introduced the  Tamil 
Immigration Fund,  which was subsequently renamed Indian Immigration Fund (1912) and  South 
Indian Labour Fund (1958).1The Fund was used to the advantage of the British and the employers 
in particular to control labour. From an indepth study of the Fund through four phases, it is 
obvious that during colonial days the Fund had benefited the employer and the British in 
controlling labour.  During the first phase (1907-1938), the Fund was mainly used for the 
recruitment and repatriation of South Indian labour. From 1908 until 1938, 1,517,864 South 
Indians were brought to Malaya at the expense of the Fund. However, the immigration function of 
the Fund ended on  15th June 1938 when the Government of India banned assisted emigration of 
unskilled Indian labour to Malaya. The ban stopped regular flow of labour from South India and 
virtually closed the chapter on the Indian Immigration Committee and its Fund but assessment 
reports on Indian labour continued to be collected up to the end of 1941. 
 
The first phase of the world economic recession  (1929-32)  had great effect on the Malaysian 
economy, in particular  primary commodities like tin and rubber. The rubber sector suffered the 
most when the labourers’ wages were reduced from 50  to 20 cents and many were retrenched 
(Bauer 1961: 192). Since most of the labourers were unable to pick up other skills they found it 
difficult to be hired and became jobless. To stop the increase in  joblessness  among plantation 
workers, the Immigration Restriction Ordinance which provided for estate workers to leave 
Malaya was introduced in August 1930 (Netto  1961: 11) The British feared that wages reduction  
below the standard fixed would create labour unrest in Malaya (Gangulee 1947: 128). This led to 
thousands of them returning to India. Those who decided to stay put were paid meagre wages 
compared to what they had earned in 1929.  On the part of the British, they were not happy with  
repatriation but had to comply with Indian rules on the need to take care of the workers welfare. 
The European planters were not keen to create Indian permanent labour force in Malaya 
(Gangulee 1947: 128) and also were unhappy with Indian public opinion over higher wages and 
other amenities of life. The British government in Malaya threatened to replace Indian labourers 
with Chinese. From 1931 attempts were made to negotiate with the government of Java 
(Netherland Indies) to supply Javanese labour (Gangulee 1947: 128). They even granted  vacant 
lands for the unemployed Chinese to cultivate vegetables and commercial crops (Khoo Kay Kim 
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The changes in name reflect the changing objectives of the Fund.The writer would like to thank his Ph.D.  
candidate, Pushpavalli  A. Rengasamey for concenting  to the use  her sources for writing this paper. 
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1977: 83 and Brown 1986: 1007). The British showed partiality to the Chinese although the latter   
did not suffer like the Indians during the depression. In the 1930s, the number of Chinese 
squatters increased but the British did not interfere as they were the source of supply of fresh 
vegetables and eggs (Khoo Kay Kim 1977: 83) and were regarded a  useful reservoir of casual 
labour. Fifty to sixty thousand Chinese were given Temporary Occupation Licences with the 
anticipation that after the slump had ended, they would be absorbed into the rubber and mining 
industries (Khoo Kay Kim 1977: 84) The licence given were revoked in 1934 when the depression 
was over, to ensure  enough labour was available for  the plantation and mining sectors. This is a 
clear indication British favoured the Chinese compared to the Indians although the Indians  played 
a significant role under the  Fund. 
 
During this period of depression, the Fund was not used to help the Indians in the 
agricultural scheme. The Indians in the estates were badly neglected. The Fund could have been 
used for a land settlement scheme that would have been beneficial for  them. The Fund could 
have also been  utilized to create skillful workers among the Indians who would have been 
independent like the Chinese. Only a few isolated attempts were made to settle Indians who 
preferred not to be repatriated like in the case of  Chuah Settlement in Port Dickson and Sungai 
Ujong Settlement (Khoo Kay Kim 1977: 85 and The Settlement of Tamil Labourers on the Land: 
1938). These schemes were not succcesful because the British were not sincere in helping the 
Indian plantation workers.  
 
No Attempt To Make Indians  Full Citizens of Malaya 
 
The abolition of the Kangani system in 1938 which saw the end of recruitment of unskilled 
labourers has to be analysed within the broader context of political development in Malaya. Indian 
based organizations in Malaya like the Central Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) which was 
founded in 1936 were very critical of the British rule and labour exploitation (Anbalakan 2008: 38-
39). Composed of educated and articulate Indians, it highlighted the plight of Indian labour, 
arguing that the immigration machinery was not geared to the good of labourers and that Indian 
immigrants should be accepted in Malaya as full citizens with a stake in the future of the country 
(Ramasamy 1994: 28).  
 
The demand, by the Indian intellectuals were not given due attention by the British who  
were more interested to find a solution to the problem created by the   Indian governments ban 
on the import of unskilled workers. Attempts were made to recruit Indonesian labourers (F.M.S. 
Enactment No. 17 of 1941)2which permitted the Indian Immigration Committee to impose levy 
and collect assessments and expend the balance of the Fund’s money, whose assets in 1941 
totaled more than $4 million, on the importation of NetherlandsIndies or Javanese labour.3The 
enactment was  apparently not brought into force before the Japanese invasion (Parmer 1960: 
45).4 Here again it is obvious British had no intention to take care of the welfare of the Indian 
workers. Their focus was  concentrated on meeting their own economic interest in Malaya. 
                                                          
2
General Advisor Johore. 441/1940,Encouragement of the Immigration of Javanese Labourers into Malaya. 
3
 A Labour Department memorandum written in 1935 had  anticipated the Indian ban and proposed that the 
Indian Immigration Fund be used to promote Chinese or Javanese immigration. 
4
In 1948, “Recruitment of Indigenous Labour Bill” came up for consideration but it was not adopted by the 




Second World War and the “Death Railway” Project 
 
During the war, Indian labourers from Malaya were  recruited to work on the Japanese Siam-
Burma railway which is often called “The Railway of Death”. The project saw thousands perish. 
When British returned to rule under the British Military Administration (BMA)5 from September 
1945 to April 1946 no effort was made to use the fund to uplift the social life of the Indians who 
were living under miserable conditions.  
 
However,the British appointed a new Indian Immigration Committee to oversee the Fund. 
The Committee made an effort to trace all the relevant records and money amounting to 5-6 
million dollars at the end of 1941. According to George Netto (1961: 72), between 1942-43, it was 
estimated that 75,000 Indian labourers from estates and government departments were brought 
to work on the “Death Railway” construction. From this total, 45,000 labourers were reported to 
have died in Siam and their families in Malaya were left without any care. Paul Kratoska (1997: 
184) claims that  many of the labourers who were recruited to work in the death railway died of  
malnutrition and  suffered diseases like malaria and skin ulcer. Indians were impoverished and the 
Indian population was markedly reduced under the British in post-war Malaya. There was a 
significant drop in mortality rate among Indians – Stenson (1980: 90) estimates a drop of 100 000 
or 7% whereas  Paul H.Kratoska (1997: 184) reports a drop from 744.202 (1941) to  599,616 (1947) 
- more than 19%. 
 
 The BMA which took over the administration of Malaya after the war had to shoulder two 
great responsibilities: first to take care of the welfare of those who suffered during the war and 
second to rehabilitate the economy. To address the matter, the Emergency Relief Committeeand  
Welfare Council were formed to take care of those who suffered in the war. The War Damage 
Compensation Fund was formed to rehabiliate the plantation and mining sectors (Hara Fujio 1993: 
119-140). Various international bodies like the Silver Jubilee Committee, Australian Red Cross 
Society and Indian Red Cross Society also  helped those who suffered in the war. Unfortunately, 
there was no effort on the part of the Fund to help Indian plantation  workers who went through 
immense hardships during the war. It was clear that the British did not have  the social welfare 
concerns of these workers at heart even when  Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
individuals raised humanitarian  issues openly. 
 
Many quarters critised the the government for not taking care of the Indians who had sacrificed 
immensely for the economic development of Malaya before the war.  W.H.Esson  urged  the Fund  
to contribute financial aid to the Ramakrishna Mission where  80% of its occupants  were children 
of Indian labourers who died in the conctruction of the Death railway. Dr McGregor ( Director of 
Medical and Health, Malayan Union (MU)) stressed that the Fund should offer financial aid to 
those who suffered during the war . R.P.Bingham (Labour Commissioner in Singapore) criticized  
the Malayan Union government for taking a long time to help those who suffered during the war.  
E.J.C.Edwards (member of the Immigration Committee)  stressed that the  MU government was 
                                                          
5
British Military Administration (BMA) was established by the British Military Chief Commander, Lord Louis 
Mountbatten on 15
th
 August 1945. It was  responsible for the administration of the redevelopment of the 
influence of the British in Malaya after the Japanese occupation.  
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slow to assist children whose parents had perished during  the Railway tragedy. According to  
E.J.C.Edwards,  
 
Little had been done by the Government in this direction; towards dealing with the 
problem of the widows and orphans of Indian labourers on estates who died in 
Siam though nearly two years has passed since the re-occupation.6 
 
 
The predicament faced by the children of the Indian laboures who died during the building of 
Death railway cleary indicates British insensitivities to a people who had made immence 
contributions to the nation’s coffers. 
 
Indian Economic Status When Estates Were Fragmented 
 
Before independence, one of the serious problems which befell plantation workers was thatof 
estate fragmentation. According to Stenson, between 1950-1967, approximately 324,931 acres of 
estate involving 28,363 workers were fragmented. (Stenson 1980: 203). This situation was 
capitalised  by Chinese businessmen to buy and further divide the land into smaller units to obtain 
larger profits. The repercussions of this were  severely felt by the Indian labourers (Nagarajan 
2004: 268 and Ummadevi Suppiah 2004: 66-73). The owners of the new plantations were also 
more keen on recruiting Malay labourers on contract basis to curb the formation of worker unions 
among Indian labourers. It also fulfilled post-independence Government policy which required the 
presence of Malay workers in all sectors (Stenson, 1980: 36). Fragmentation led to thousands of 
Indian labourers losing their jobs. Those who chose to stay in the estates had to settle for lower 
wages, and were denied health and other facilities (Chandra Muzaffar, 1993: 222).  
 
The MIC attempted to protect the welfare of Indian labour by buying over small estates through 
the establishment of NLFCS (National Land Finance Co-operative Society) in 1960 (Nagarajan 
2004:37). Between 1961-1969, NLFCS bought 18 estates (Anbalakan 2008: 267). MIC and NLFCS 
urged the Government to draft laws controlling the sale of estates exceeding 100 acres but there 
was lukewarm response from the government. According to Chandra Muzaffar, 
 
… the subdivision issue exposed the political impotence of a marginal community. For all appeals 
from the NUPW, the MIC and other Indian organizations, government response wasvery lukewarm. 
There was no attempt by the government to purchase estates or to help workers form 
cooperatives… (Chandra Muzaffar, 1993: 220). 
 
Although the effect of the policy was felt by the Indians after independependence, the problem 
had its origins in the  1950s when estate owners decided to give up their properties in anticipation 
of independence. 
 
From the discussion, one could sense that the Indians were a neglected lot under  British rule . The  
same cannot be said of the Malays and the Chinese. 
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Treatment of Indians vis-à-vis the other Races in British Malaya 
 
The deplorable position of the Indians cannot be truly understood without reference to the more 
favourable conditions under which the Malays and the Chinese thrived in British Malaya. 
 
Position of the Malays as ‘Sons of the Soil” 
 
In contrast to the other races, the Malays were always looked after by the British on the premise  
that it was with the rulers consent that they were able to rule Malaya. Therefore they were 
obliged to protect the natives from any encroachment be it from the outsiders (capitalists) or 




Pensions to the Malay Rulers and upholding their position as Conservative Authoritity7 
 
With  the intervention by the British in 1874, and the consequent introduction of  western style of 
administration, thesocial structure of the Malay society started to collapse. British Residents 
began to replace the Sultans and district officers replaced the village chiefs. Consequently the 
Rajas and the Malay chiefs were paid allowances and pensions and Malay officials were paid 
salaries. This resulted in power and wealth being transferred to the western bureaucratic system 
(Sadka, 1968: 275). 
 
Western bureaucracy also terminated the bond of the people with the Malay rulers which was 
described as a protector-protected relationship. The protector's role depended on his ability to 
control resources such as land and employees. This ability enabled the protector to get support 
from the protected (Norazit Selat 1987: 150-151). This relationship was severed when the British 
appointed district officers to manage the affairs of the district and the needs of the land were 
registered at the Land Office. The Malay ruling elite's control over the Chinese entrepreneurs was 
also affected when their role was limited to the collection of import and export taxes, and of 
allocating concessions to investors. The Chinese could now bypass the Malay rulers to deal directly 
with the British administrators (Sivachandralingam Sundara Raja 2006: 85). Thus, in the western 
administrative system, the Malay ruling class now played the role of champion of religion and 
customs as enshrined in the Treaty of Pangkor.  
 
It is clear although Malay rulers lost their position with British intervention,  attempt was made to 
retain their traditional  authority. This is clearly explained by Norman G. Owen; 
  
Despite attempts by some disgruntled district chiefs deprived of traditional tax 
and toll revenues to rebel against British control, the Malay ruling class accepted 
the steady advancement of colonial authority for reasons that ranged from the 
elaborate palaces and substantial incomes provided for the Sultans to political 
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The writer would like to thank his Ph.D.  candidate,  Dr. Ummadevi Suppiah  for concenting  to use her 
sources to write on this topic. 
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pensions for dispossessed district chiefs, membership of new state councils, and 
salaried posts at the lower levels of local administration ....Within Malay society 
itself they [Sultans] not only remained paramount but had their positions 
considerably strengthened by the reduction of previously competitive territorial 
chiefs to the status of titled courtiers or government-paid officials and by the 
strengthening of their authority over all things Islamic. Treaty clauses exempting 
from Residential advice matters touching on "Malay religion and custom" 
encouraged both a turning to the ceremonial trappings of Malay life and, more 
important, the eventual creation in most states of elaborate and powerful 
administrative and judicial establishments for the governance of Islamic matters, 
which became major repositories of conservative authority (Owen 2005: 145). 
 
 
Protecting Malay Civil Servants From  the Clutches of  the Chettiar 
 
One of the serious problems faced by the British was the tendency of poorly paid Malay civil 
servants to borrow money from the Chettiar.During the recession following First World War there 
was a change in British policy that replaced British civil servants with Malays. As a result, the 
British began to train and appoint English-educated Malays from among  members of the 
aristocracy and the commoners to fill subordinate (administrative assistants to the British officers) 
and clerical positions.8The purpose of these appointments was to ease the burden on the 
government of having to payhigh salaries to the British officers.  
 
Malay civil servants who borrowed from the Chettiar came from various grades of officers and 
clerks who worked with the government in varying capabilities such as  teachers of government 
assisted Malay schools.The number of civil servants who borrowed money from the Chettiar 
increased during the era of the recession. There is evidence from  Federal Council proceedings to  
show a higher number of government servants  from the clerical group borrowed from the 
Chettiar as compared to  higher ranking civil servants.9In 1930, the Federal Council amended the 
Public Servants Liabilities Enactment 1902 to protect the interests of Malay clerks who continually 
borrowed from the Chettiar.  
 
The passing  of the Enactment  proves that the British were genuinely concerned with the 
predicament faced by Malay civil servants who  borrowed money from the Chettiars. 
 
Preferential Recruitment Policy for the Malays  
 
                                                          
8
British intent to use aristocrats in the civil service was achieved with the help of the Malay College Kuala 
Kangsar (MCKK) founded in 1905. Malays appointed into the civil service  were placed under the Malay 
Administrative Service (MAS). They were subordinate to their superiors  in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS). 
After 1910, a small number of Malay officers were promoted and absorbed into the MCS when the British 
introduced a new scheme for  Higher Subordinate Class of Officers in NNMB. Under this scheme, many 
Malays including the Malay commoners had the chance to hold posts in the civil service through education 
and training offered at MCKK. 
9
FCP, 1930, Vol. I, p. B79; FCP, 1934, p. B25. 
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With the onset of the Great Depression renewed attention was paid to the implementation of the 
preferential recruitment policy for the Malays. General Orders 12 (viii) of 1931 explicitly stated 
that it was the official policy to give qualified Malays preference over other applicants for an 
appointment. Selection should be made from Malay-born candidates of other races only when 
there were no satisfactory Malay candidates (Clause 12 (viii) of the General Orders FMS, 1931, 
from Tay Gaik Yeong 1969: 100.) The regulation tightened the loophole in the 1923 General Order 
which did not specify the position of a qualified Malay if there were other similarly qualified local-
born candidates applying for the same post. Malay appointment committees were set up in the 
principal towns of the FMS to register the names and qualifications of English educated Malays 
desiring to enter Government service. Department heads were advised not to employ non-Malays 
without first consulting the appropriate localcommittee. (FMS Circular No./ 14, 1931 from Tay Gaik 
Yeong 1969). 
 
Enactment of Malay Land Enactment 1913 
 
Unlike the position of the Indians, the status of the Malays as the native inhabitants of the country 
was preserved and protected. This can be seen from the British practice to maintain the status of 
the Malay rulers, the introduction of the Malay Reserve Land Enactment (TSM) 1913 to ensure 
Malay land was not controlled by non-Malays, and many other laws. Efforts to protect them 
continued when the Malays were entrapped in the problem of indebtedness to the Chettiar. This 
was apparent in  the beginning of the 20th century when many Malays pledged their lands as 
collateral to the Chettiar and becoming  indebted as a result. To protect the Malaysfrom the 
clutches of the Chettiar, the British implemented  various legislative measures from 1900-1941 
and established  cooperatives as a means of providing funds to help the Malays.  
 
The issue of Malay farmers losing their land to the Chettiar became serious at the end of 
the 1910s due to the development of the rubber sector. Malay farmers usually mortgaged 
available land to the Chettiar for festival and wedding as well as Haj pilgrimage while only a small 
number of them borrowed for  agriculture and animal husbandry.10Ironically, the Malays also sold 
land for high profits to European and Chinese investors who were engaged in rubber cultivation. 
According to Voon, in 1910, sale of land to foreign investors in the district of Semenyih and Ulu 
Semenyih totalled 108 cases involving 560 acres of land while 113 sales were recorded from 1910-
15 (Voon 1960 :555).From 1909-1910, a total of 1,584 plots of land in Selangor with an area of 
7,567 acres were sold to non-Malays.11 This problem of the Malay farmers losing their land 
through loans from the Chettiar and the sale of land to foreign investors caught the attention of 
the British. To prevent this situation from worsening, the British took the legal approach by 
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Report and Proceedings of the Committee appointed to consider why the system of small loans to native 
agriculturists had failed in Perak, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, 1912, SSF 2056/1912. 
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Report by the Committee appointed to inquire into and report on the question of the alienation of 




Although the Enactment did not prevent the Malays from borrowing  from the Chettiars, 
nevertheless this  was an attempt by the British to prevent  Malay land from falling into the hands 




Formation of Cooperatives 
 
The idea of establishing cooperatives came about in 1907 but the British were forced to cancel 
its implementation due to the Malay-Muslim reaction to the practice of ‘riba’ or usury that was 
said to be against the principles of Islam. In 1922, the first rural cooperative was founded under 
the Co-operative Societies Enactment, according to which cooperatives may be divided into two 
main categories: rural and urban. Rural cooperatives in turn be divided into seasonal credit 
societies, general purposes societies and labourers thrift and credit societies. Urban 
cooperatives (better known as Thrift and Loan Societies)  were meant for salaried 
employees.12By the 1930s, various categories of rural and urban cooperatives began to grow. 
The initial success of cooperatives in Krian prompted the British to establish more cooperatives 
in Malaya. By June 30, 1930, there were 150 registered cooperatives in both the Federated 
Malay States (FMS) and Straits Settlements (SS) with 27 of them being Thrift & Loan 
Societies.13By 1931, the number of cooperatives in FMS and SS  increased to 199. 
  
The idea of establishing cooperatives may well indicate that the British had a clear policy to help 
the Malays from being suppressed by the Chettiars. 
 
Formation of RIDA and FELDA   in the 1950s 
 
To assist Malays in rural areas, the Government established various agencies including  RIDA (Rural 
Industrial Development Authority) and FELDA (Federal  Land Development Authority). RIDA was 
established in 1953 and functioned as an agency to uplift the rural community through social, 
economic and infrastructural development. FELDA was set up in 1956 to open and develop new 
land on a large scale for agriculture and resettlement (Hooker 2003: 227). Malay families were 
relocated from rural areas to FELDA land schemes to cultivate rubber and oil palm. These pioneers 
were also provided with housing and basic facilities. Between 1960 and 1981, a total of 71,000 
poor families were settled in 308 schemes. The incomes of these families progressively increased. 
In a period of 26 years, the population in such schemes increased to 2.5 million from the original 
71,000 families (Hooker 2003: 227-228). By the end of the 1970s, FELDA had developed 308,400 
acres of land, and settled 20,700 families in 90 schemes (Jesudason 1990: 51).  
 
RIDA and FELDA were attempts by the British to empower the Malay economy. Such policies 
explained  why the Malays  were in a better position after independence compared to the Indians. 
                                                          
12
 According to B.J Surridge (Cooperative Advisor, Secretary of the Colonies and the Federation), by the 
1930s, the urban cooperatives grew rapidly with a variety of jobs according to states and districts (Reportby 
B. J Surridge, O.B.E, Adviser on Co-operation for the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Co-operation in 
the Federation, 23 Nov. 1949, p.1, FS 1948-57, 1447/1949).  
13
FCP, 1930, Vol.II, p. C 411. 
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Position of  the Chinese Under British Rule 
 
British Perception on the  Chinese 
In the eyes of the British administrators and British travellers, the Chinese were a community who 
worked  hard and constituted an  asset for the government in power. This explains why they were given a 
free hand to play a vital role in the economy of Malaya in the late 19th  and early 20th century.  
According to Isabella, “The Chinese promise to be in some sort the commercial rulers of the Straits. It is by 
their capital, industry and enterprise that the resources of the Peninsula are being developed” (Bird 
1980:256-257). It explains why the British administrators and capitalists developing the agriculture and 
mining sectors in the Malay states were dependent on them.  
It was no surprise how the Chinese came to play  a vital role in the affairs of the Archipelago, particularly 
Malaya.  Francis Light himself had praised the Chinese in 1794 as, “…  the only people of the East from 
whom a revenue may be raised without expense and extraordinary effort of government” (Andaya and 
Andaya, 1982: 137). Raffles himself took steps to educate the Chinese in Singapore as they were seen as 
an asset to develop Singapore (JIEA 1855: 119). The Chinese were generally preferred by the Europeans 
on account of their reliability  and perseverance. The Chinese were also employed to collect excise 
revenues. European trade in the Straits Settlements was  managed almost exclusively by the Chinese 
(JIEA 1855: 119).  
Swettenham on the other hand believed only the English and the Chinese possessed the necessary traits 
to succeed in the Malayan modern economy ( Baker 1999: 196). The Chinese were good in grabbing 
investment and business opportunities. To quote Frank Swettenham of the Chinese in his book the Real 
Malay: “They [Chinese] are the bees who suck the honey from every profitable undertaking” 
(Swettenham 1900: 38).This is why the British gave the Chinese the upperhand in the economy and it 
explains why the other races, especially the Indians were sidelined. The Indians were always regarded as 
docile and not willing to grab the opportunity. This explains why they were not highly looked upon by 
the British.  Isabella’s  view with regard to the Indian race does explain why Indians have failed in  
modern day Malaysia. She compares them to the other races and observes  that “….Klings [Indians] are 
active and industrious, but they lack fibre apparently, and that quick-sightedness for opportunities which 
makes the Chinese the most successful of all emigrants. Not a Malay or a Kling has raised himself either 
as merchant or  in any other capacity to wealth or distinction in the colony” (Bird 1980: 115-116). 
Chinese Preference in the Economic Activities  
 
The economic growth witnessed by the Malay states in the late 19th and 20th century was very 
much related to British policy which helped the Chinese to secure their economic position vis a vis 
the Malays and Indians. British perception of the Chinese  enabled the latter to play a vital role in 
the Malayan economy which in turn benefitted the British.For example the British benefitted from  
import duties derived from Chinese  opium trade. Between 1900 and 1930, close to a quarter of 
government revenue in the FMS was generated through opium (Barker 1999: 185). Much of the 
money needed to build roads and railways came from the sale of opium. 
 
The Chinese migrant labour and migrants created Chinese cities in Penang and Singapore and were 
also responsible in the development of tin mining industry in Perak and Selangor and plantation 
agriculture in the Straits Settlements and Malay states.  During their early  arrival Chinese provided 
cheap coolie labour in the mines, rubber estates and ports. Later they acted as middlemen and 
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retailers. The British also allowed transportation, distribution and sale of imported goods to be 
controlled by the Chinese. When British were interested in large-scale capital investment that 
could produce profits for their share holders back home and in developing a market for their 
manufactured goods, the Chinese grabbed the opportunity. This saw the Chinese getting involved 
in small scale enterprises related  trucking firms, ice factories, coastal shipping, buses, food 
processing, entertaintment centres and rice milling. The Chinese also helped to sell British goods 
by opening up shop houses where the family lived upstairs and conducted business downstairs. 
(Baker 1999: 183).The power of this symbiotic relationship was almost impossible to penetrate. 
 
There is no doubt that it was the British who allowed the Chinese to wield a dominant role  in the 
economy. This enabled them to control many services which they were not willing to giveup easily. 
This explains why the Indians were lost in comparison  to the Chinese and the Malays. 
 
Economic Position of the Chinese During Emergency 
 
There were efforts to revive the economic position of the Chinese during the Emergency period 
(1948-1960). When communist threats occurred, the Government established new settlement 
areas known as New Villages under the Briggs programme. A total of 572, 917 people (85% 
Chinese, 9% Malays, 4% Indians and 1% other races) were located in 480 new villages (Francis Loh 
Kok Wah, 2000: 257). These locations were supplied with basic facilities such as roads, water, 
electricity and others. The Malays expressed their dissatisfaction as their economic position was 
relatively worse off compared to that of the Chinese in the new settlements. Furthermore, land 
converted into new settlements was Malay reserve land, acquired from Malay rulers on the 
understanding that there was a need to set up new settlements for security purposes.(Ongkili 
1985: 86).The land was subsequently  owned by the Chinese on a permanent basis, and that 




From the above discussion, it is evident that the Indians in Malaya were  a “lost race” in 
comparison to the  Chinese and the Malays. To the British, the Indians were not regarded as an 
asset unlike the Chinese; neither was the British obliged to help them as in the case of the Malays. 
The Indians never figured in the mind of British policy makers, a historical  tragedy which  
continued long after the country achieved independence. It has to be noted that during colonial 
rule, Indians contributed significantly to the economic development of the country (especially in  
the rubber industry and the building of roads and railways). Their contribution was  not 
appreciated by the British as  was evidenced in the way the  South Indian Labour Fund was 
implemented. They suffer during the Japanese occupation and in the aftermath of the war when 
there were no affirmative action plans on their behalf. The  Indians were  marginalised both by the 
British and the post-independent government in power. This was even admitted by none other 
than the current Prime Minister in 2013. The Chinese on the otherhand had been  preferred by  
the British due to their character and contribution to the British economy. This shows  that the 
British were only keen to assist  those whose support was not to be taken for granted.  The Malays 
needed to be assisted  as “sons of the soil” to allow for continued British interest in the country; 
and they were also bound to assist the Chinese who were aggressive, enterprising and multi-
skilled as well as ubiquitous and visible, with a readiness to serve without encumbrances.The 
Indians were the helpless lot, with very little role to play in the British economy. This  explains why 
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their concerns never attracted the attention both the  British and the leadership of post-
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